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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DIsCRETIoN-REOCATIoN OF
SECOND CLASS MAIL PRiviLEL.-The relator, having had due notice, was repre-
sented at a hearing before an administrative officer, at which an order was
entered revoking its second-class mail privilege granted in 1911. This order was
based on certain articles, appearing in the relator's newspaper at frequent inter-
vals during a period of five months. These articles were declared to be non-
mailable because they violated the Espionage Act. On appeal to the Postmaster-
General, the order was approved. The relator then brought this writ of error on
the grounds that the order was unconstitutional, because it did not afford the
relator a trial in a court of competent jurisdiction, that the order deprived the
relator of the right of free speech, and was destructive of the rights of free
press, and deprived it of its property without due process of law. Held, that
the order was constitutional. Brandeis and Holmes, JJ., dissenting. United States
ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson (1921) 41 Sup. Ct.
352.
Hearings, similar to that accorded to the relator in the instant case, when fairly
conducted, satisfy all the requirementsof due process of law. Public Clearing
House va Coyne (19o4) 194 U. S. 497, 24 Sup. Ct. 789; see Smith v. Hitchcock
(1912) 226 U. S. 53, 6o, 33 Sup. Ct. 6, 8; 2 Willoughby, Constitutional Law
(i91o) 1283. Since the filing of the petition in the instant case the Espionage
Act had been held constitutional. Abrams v. United States (1919) 250 U. S.
616, 40 Sup. Ct. 17; see COMMENTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 337; 33 HARV.
L. REv. 442. The second-class privilege is granted upon an application of the
publisher for entry in that class, after an investigation of the character of the
newspaper by the Postmaster-General under the rules and regulations prescribed
by him. U. S. Postal Laws & Regulations (1913) sec. 411-435; Cf. Smith V.
Hitchcock, supra. This permit contains the provision that "the authority herein
given is revocable upon determination by the Department that the publication
does not conform to law." The Espionage Act declares that.any newspaper
violating any provision of the act is "non-mailable matter" which shAll "not be.
conveyed in the mails, or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier."
National Defense Act, 1917, sec. I (40 Stat. at L. 217, 23o). The Postmaster-
General has the power "to execute all laws relating to the postal service." Act
of June 8, 1872 (17 Stat. at L. 283, 285). The holding of the court that there
was a sufficient delegation of power to warrant the respondent's order seems
sound. Courts are reluctant to disturb an exercise of discretion by a Postmaster-
General under delegated powers. See Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne (A9o4) 194
U. S. io6, I1O, 24 Sup. Ct. 595, 597; cf. Public Clearing House v. Coyne, supra.
The objection of the dissenting judges, in the instant case, that the effect of the
order, therein rendered, was to deprive the relator of the privilege of the second-
class rate in the future for publishing non-mailable matter in the past, seems
unsound, because, on a new application, by proving it is now publishing mailable
matter, the relator would be entitled to a new permit. The dissenting opinions
seem to doubt the value of this privilege. For a discussion of governmental
regulations in similar matters, see Hart, Power of Government over Speech and
Press (1920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 410.
ADMIRALTY-EXTENT OF LIABILITY TO INJURED SRAMAN.-The -plaintiff was
injured by an accident for which the shipowner was in no way at fault. He was
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brought a long distance back to the home port and meanwhile was not furnished
with proper medical attention. He brought actions to recover for the injuries,
for failure to furnish him with proper medical attention, and for "maintenance
and cure" after the termination of his employment. Held, that he could recover
for the failure to furnish him with proper medical attention, and for his care
for a reasonable time after the termination of his employment. Falk v. Thurlow
(1921, Sup. Ct.) 114 Misc. 586, 187 N. Y. Supp. 57.
It is well settled that a shipowner, though himself not at fault, owes some duty
to "maintain and cure" a seaman taken sick or injured in the service of his ship
through no wilful misconduct of his own. The Osceola (1903) i89 U. S. 158,
175, 23 Sup. .Ct. 483, 487; see Smith, Liability in Admiralty for Injuries to
Seaman (igo6) i9 HARv. L. REV. 418. But the courts are in conflict as to the
limits of this liability. The term "cure" was probably originally used in the
sense of "care," and not in the sense of healing. See The Atlantic (1849, S. D.
N. Y.) Fed. Cas. No. 620. Some courts hold that the duty of the shipowner
terminates with the completion of the voyage. Anderson v. Rayner [19o3] i
K. B. 589; The I. F. Card (i8po, E. D. Mich.) 43 Fed. 92. Others consider
the duty as continuing until a cure is effected as far as possible. Reed v. Canfield
(1832, C. C. D. Mass.) I Sumner, i95; The Lizzie Frank (1887, S. D. Ala.) 3
Fed. 477. While some allow expenses for maintenance and medical treatment
incurred within a reasonable time after the termination of the employment.
The Bouker No. 2 (1917, C. C. A. 2d) 24i Fed. 831; The Ella. S. Thayet,
(1887, N. D. Calif.) 40 Fed. 9o2, 904. A seaman can recover for the injuries
resulting from a failure to provide him with proper medical attention. Scarff v.
Metcalf (1887) iO7 N. Y. 211, 13 N. E. 796; The Troop (I9o2, D. D. Wash.)
1i8 Fed. 769. In no case, can he recover full indemnity for the injury itself,
unless it was due to the failure of the owner to furnish and maintain a
seaworthy vessel, or safe appliances. See Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship
Co. (i9z8) 247 U. S. 372, 380, 38 Sup. Ct. 501, 502. The injured seaman cannot
take advantage of any of the several workmen's compensation acts. Southern
Pac. Co. v. Jensen (917) 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524; Knickerbocker Ice Co.
v. Stewart (1920) 253 U. S. 149, 40 Sup. Ct. 438. Thus, it appears that sea-
men, who have been called the "wards of the court," are now in a less favored
position than land workmen under workmea's compensation acts.. In view of
this situation, and considering the improvidence of the average seaman, it would
seem better policy to require the shipowner to maintain and care for a seaman
injured in his service, not only for a reasonable time after the termination of
the employment, but until cure. See federal statute of June 5, i92o, extending
to seamen the benefit of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, not yet passed
upon by the courts.
CONFLICT OF LAws-FoRElaN JUDMENTS-JURISDIcTIoN-NATu.E OF INTER-
PLEADEP.-A, the holder of certificates in an unincorporated mutual benefit
association, whose principal office was in New York, died domiciled in Maryland,
his wife, B, having predeceased him. The Association levied assessments and
deposited the money collected with its general beneficiary fund. The Association
filed a bill of interpleader in New York against several claimants of the money,
all of whom except A's son were non-residents of the state. Service was made
upon the representative of B's estate by publication. Final judgment was
rendered in favor of the son and the money was paid to him. After the
commencement of the foregoing action, and before the 'attempted service upon
B's representative was completed, the representative of B's estate sued the
Association in Maryland. The Association set up the New York judgment, but
the Maryland court decided that the New York court had acquired no jurisdiction,
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and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The judgment was assigned
to C, who sought to enforce it in New York against the Association. Held, that
the interpleader action was a proceeding in personam, that the New York court
had acquired no jurisdiction over the representative of B's estate by publication
of the summons in the original action, and that the plaintiff -was entitled to
judgment. Hanna v. Stedman (1921) 230 N. Y. 326, 13o N. E. 566.
Of the two conflicting judgments in the case the earlier one would control by
virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution if the court
had jurisdiction. Jurisdiction within the meaning of the constitutional provision
exists if the action is one in rein and the res is within the state. In such a
case service by publication upon a non-resident defendant is sufficient Personal
service or consent is required, however, if the action is in personain. Pennoyer
V. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714. Whether an exception should be recognized with
respect to citizens of the state or residents domiciled therein so as to authorize
a personal judgment upon constructive service is not finally determined. See
McDonald v. Mabie (1917) 243 U. S. 90, 37 Sup. Ct. 343. Differing from
garnishment proceedings, a bill of interpleader does not seek to apply property to
the payment of debts, but.determines merely personal rights to a money demand.
N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy (i9i6) 241 U. S. 518, 36 Sup. Ct. 613; Huston,
The Enforcement of Decrees in Equity (1915) 63-65. Interpleader is a pro-
ceeding in personam, even though the fund in dispute is placed in possession
of the, court. Cross v. Amnstrong (1887) 44 Ohio St. 613, io N. E. i6o. As the
New York court had obtained no jurisdiction over the representative of B's
estate, the judgment was not binding 6pon him. The Maryland judgment, on
the other hand, was entitled to full faith and credit in New York because the
Association had been served in Maryland and had appeared in the action. The
decision emphasized the need of legislation giving to bills of interpleader in rein
effect, so that a party seeking interpleader, who has paid the money into court
or has delivered the res to the court, may be protected against suits in other
jurisdictions by non-residents who have been served merely by publication.
Under the existing law such party can protect himself against the contingency
which happened here only by demanding a bond in indemnity from the suc-
cessful party in the interpleader proceedings. See Stevenson v. Anderson
(1814, Ch.) 2 Ves. & B. 407.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS-CNVICrION FOR
CRIMINAL ANARcHY.-The defendant was part owner and business manager
of "The Revolutionary Age" and had knowledge of the publication therein of
the "manifesto" of the "Left Wing" section of the Socialist party. The mani-
festo advocated as a "direct objective" the "conquest by the proletariat of the
power of the state," and that this be accomplished by conquering and destroying
"the bourgeois parliamentary state," the weapon to be the "political mass
strike." The defendant was tried and convicted under authority of sections
i6o-i6i of the New York Penal laws (Laws of 1902, ch. 371), making the
advocacy of criminal anarchy a felony. Held, that the conviction should be
affirmed. People v. Gitlow (1921, N. Y. App. Div.). 65 N. Y. L. J. 93.
The decision repudiates the test urged by many authorities, that only agitation
creating a "clear and present danger" of criminal acts may be constitutionally
subject to punishment. See Shenck v. United States (1919) 249 U. S. 47, 39
Sup. Ct 247; dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United
States (1919) 250 U. S. 616, 40 Sup.. Ct. 17; see COMMENTS (1919) 29 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 337. The doctrine of "constructive intent" is applied by holding
that since the mass strike cannot be employed without force, violence and
bloodshed, the defendants must be presumed to intend the use of such means.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
This doctrine has been the subject of harsh and able criticism. See Chafee,
Freedom of Speech (1920) 54 ff; but see contra, Corwin, Freedom of Speech
and Press (1920) 30 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 48. It is further held that the jury
was warranted in finding that "unlawful means" were contemplated, and that,
while the guilt of the accused could not be declared as a matter of law, the
court could well instruct that the advocacy of these doctrines violated the
statute. See Horning v. District of Columbia (1920) 41 Sup. Ct. 53; (1921)
30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 421. Theiinstant case illustrates forcibly how strong a
hold the policy of strict repression has now obtained. For recent legislative
action see NOTES (1920) 20 CoL L. REV. 7oo. The jury might very well have
convicted even though the court had not been so vigorous in its application of
the statute. One may share the court's aversion to the defendant's views andyet doubt the corrective effect and the social desirability of the means of
repression adopted. If a similar policy is applied to that most difficult of present
problems, industrial warfare, i. e. in connection with strikes which are not "mass
strikes," the misunderstanding and hatreds likely to result seem distinctly unde-
sirable. See COMMENTS (I920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 280.
CONxRAc S-ILLEALITY--ADITRATiON AGREEENTs-The plaintiff charterers
sued the defendant owners on a charter-party for damage to goods in shipment.
The defendants pleaded that the charter-party provided that all-disputes arising
under it should be referred to arbitration and that a failure to present a claim
and appoint an arbitrator within three months from the date of delivery would
bar the claim. Held, that this clause was void as against public policy. Dreyfus
Co. v. Atlantic Shipping and Trading Co. (1921, C. A.) 37 T. L. R. 417.-
The early courts looked upon arbitration agreements in contracts with
disfavor. Thompson v. Charnock ('799, K. B.) 8 T. R. 139. But where the
contract made arbitration an express condition precedent to a right of action,
the English courts have held that such an agreement does not oust the court ofits jurisdiction, for no cause of action has arisen until the condition is fulfilled.
Scott v. Avery (1856) 5 H. L. 811. Thus the distinction came to be drawnbetween agreements where arbitration was a condition precedent to an enforce-
able right, and those where it was merely agreed upon as a collateral term of the
contract, operating to create a right but not a condition precedent. Viney v.
Bignold (1887) L. R. 2o Q. B. Div. 172. Some courts construed the doctrine of
Scott v. Avery, supra, to be applicable only to agreements providing for the
arbitration of a dispute as to a particular fact, but after a period of confusioi
the law is now settled in England that agreements providing for the arbitration
of all disputed facts are valid. Trainor v. Phoenix Fire Ass. Co. Ltd. (1892,Q. B.) 65 L. T. 825; Woodall v. Pearl Ass. Co. Ltd. [1919, C. A.] z K. B. 593.
However, this confusion left its mark on the courts in this country, with the
result that there are a few decisions which hold that a clause making arbitration
of any possible dispute a condition precedent is void. Whitney v. National
Masonic Acc. Ass'n. (1893) 52 Minn. 378, 54 N. W. 184. The weight of authority
distinguishes, as in England, conditions precedent and collateral agreements to
arbitrate, holding the former a valid bar to an action on the contract and thelatter no bar at all. Graham v. Ins. Co.- (igo7) 75 Ohio St. 374, 79 N. E. 930;
Memphis Trust Co. v. Brown-Ketchum Iron Works (igo9, C. C. A. 6th) 166
Fed. ,39g. To constitute a valid bar the parties must make arbitration a condition
precedent either expressly or by necessary implication in fact. Mecartney v.
Guardian Trust Co. (19r8) 274 Mo. 224, 202 S. W. 1131. In England a further
recognition of the benefits of settling disputes by arbitration was made by
statute giving courts the discretionary power of staying actions on contracts until
the collateral'arbitration agieement has been performed. (I889) 52 & 53 Vict.
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C. 49, sec. 4. This statute accords with the decisions of England in whittling down
the common-law doctrine. See In re Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg (1921)
23o N. Y. 261, 276, 13o N. E. 288, 292. The instant case, in refusing to recog-
nize the validity of an arbitration clause containing a condition subsequent,
appears to have set a limit upon this process of qualification.
CONTPACrs-OPTIONS-NOTICE OF ELECTION EXERCISED BY MAILING LETTERi.-
The plaintiff company had an option to renew a contract for the defendants'
services provided it gave the defendants notice of its election. A letter con-
taining the notice was posted in due time, but was never received by the defend-
ants. Held, that the option was sufficiently exercised by the mailing of the letter.
Shubert Theatrical Co. v. Rath (Feb. 16, I92i) U. S. C. C. A. 2d, Oct. Term,
192, No. 170.
Options have been interpreted both as conditional contracts and continuing
offers, though it has been pointed out that there is a distinction between an
option and an offer. Langdell, Equitable Conversion (904) 18 H~av. L. REv.
11, 12. Whichever view one adopts, the legal relations created are the same. The
optionee has the power to bind the optionor upon the terms and conditions of the
contract. Giving of notice may be a condition precedent to the optionee's rights
under the contract or it may be a prescribed manner of acceptance. In leasing
contracts, with option to renew, notice has generally been held to be a condition
precedent to the right to renew, and 'this condition is fulfilled only upon the
receipt of the notice by the lessor. Bluthenthal v. Atkinson (igio) 93 Ark. 252,
124 S. W. 510; Doepfner v. Bowers (1907, Sup. Ct.) 55 Misc. 56I, io6 N. Y.
Supp. 932. This rule has been generally followed in other option contracts where
notice is expressly required. Mere mailing of the notice is not sufficient, except
when the party to be notified conceals himself or in some other way tries to
avoid the service of the notice. Haldane v. United States (I895, C. C. A. 8th)
69 Fed. 819; Wheeler v. McStay (1913) 16o Iowa, 745, 141 N. W. 404, L. R. A.
1915 B, x8i, note. So, in insurance contracts requiring notice of cancellation or
of assessments, notice means actual notice, and the mere posting of the letter is
not sufficient. Farnum v. Phoenix Ins. Co-. (i8go) 83 Calif. 246, 23 Pac. 869;
German Union Fire Ins. Co. v. F. J. Clarke Co. (1911) 116 Md. 622, 82 Atl.
974, 39 L. R. A. (N. s.) 829, note. This result seems to be the most logical and
just, since the parties by agreement have conditioned the* acquirement or loss of
contract rights upon the giving of the notice. Hoban v. Hudson (1915) 129 Minn.
335, 152 N. W. 723, L. R. A. 19x6 B, mI14, note. The instant case reaches a con-
clusion inconsistent with the weight of authority in reasoning that the notice is
the acceptance of a continuing offer in the contract. The court overlooks the
fact that "notice" is expressly required, and even though the offer was made by
post, an inference is not warranted that the defendants consented to be served
with the notice by the mere posting of the letter. Hoban v. Hudson, supra.
CONTRACTs-LANDLORD AND TENANT-EFFEC OF THE NATIONAL PROHIBITION
LAW ON LEASEs.-The plaintiff sued for rent under a lease which provided that
the demised premises be used for a "caf" only. The defendant contended
that the Eighteenth Amendment absolved him from liability under the lease.
Held, that the plaintiff could recover. Proprietor's Realty Co. v. Wohltiann
(1921, N. J. L.) 112 Atl. 410.
In" a similar case, suit was brought to recover rent under a lease stipulating
that the demised premises were to be used for the sole purpose of carrying on a
"saloon" business. The defendant lessee pleaded the Eighteenth Amendment as
a defence. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover. Doherty -v. Monroe
Eckstein Brewing Co. (1921, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) N. Y. L. J. April 18, 1921.
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It has long been a settled rule that impossibility of performance arising from
a change in the law exonerates a promisor. AnsQn, Contract (Corbin's ed.1919) 433; where, however, the courts have tried to determine the degree Qfhardship of performance necessary to discharge a lessee, there is conflict. Some
courts hold that where premises are leased for saloon purposes only, the lesseeis not absolved from liability under a subsequently enacted prohibition statute.O'Byrne v. Henley (igog) i61 Ala. 620, 5o So. 83; Hecht Zi Acme Coal Co.(1911) ig Wyo. 18, 113 Pac. 788. Others hold that even where the premises areleased for saloon and hotel purposes the lessee is absolved. Kahn v.. Wilhelm(1915) 118 Ark. 239, 177 S, W. 403; Kaiser v. Zeigler (N. Y. Sup. Ct) N. Y. L.J. May 2, 1921. The nost logical rule, however, seems to be that the court shouldfirst inquire whether the use is permissive or restrictive. Brunswick-Balke-
Collender Co. v. Seattle Brewing etc. Co. (1917) 98. Wash. 12, 167 Pac. 58. Ifpermissive the lessee will not be discharged.' Security Bank v. Claussen. (igig,Calif. App.) 187 Pac. 14o. But if restrictive, the court should then furtherdetermine whether the business is merely made less valuable, in which case thelessee must still perform, or whether it is totally destroyed, in which case thelessee should be discharged. Conklin v. Silver (1919, Iowa) 174 N. W. 573;The Stratford Inc. v. Seattle Brewing Co. (1916) 94 Wash. 125, 162 Pac. 31.The instant New Jersey case decides that a "caf6" means -a restaurant and
saloon, and hence the rule that the business has merely become less valuable is
applied; while the New York case decides tiat the "saloon" business is totallydestroyed by the National Prohibition Act and hence the rule of total impossi-bility is applied. It is to be noted, however, that it is not the lessee's duty underthe lease (i. e. to pay rent) which has become impossible to perform, but the
condition precedent, which the court§ imply, that the premises were to be used
for a ceg-ain purpose.
CRIMINAL LAw-PROcEDURE-DouBLE JEOPAiRDy-NEw TRiAL AFTER CoNxIcrIoN
oF DEFENDANT.-The defendant was indicted for receiving stolen goods. At the
same time, but in a separate indictment, another prisoner was charged with
stealing and receiving the same goods. The two men were tried jointly and
convicted. The defendant appealed on the grounds of "mis-direction and mis-
reception of evidence." After notice of appeal it was discovered that the indict-
ments were several. Held, that the trial was a nullity and a venire de novo
should be awarded. Rex v. Crane (192o, Cr. App.) 124 L. T. R. 256.The instant case suggests the interesting and much controverted question asto the extent of the power .of a court to order a new trial in a criminal case
after conviction., Unquestionably the early English law was to the effect that a
court had no such power. It was argued that the defendant would be placed indouble jeopardy. See King v. Mawbey (1796, K. B.) 6 T. R. 620, 638; I Chitty,Criminal Law (1819) secs. 653, 654. But, as in the instant case, a distinction
was made where the court had no jurisdiction and the tri~l was a nullity. Rex v.Fowler (1821, K. B.) 4 Barn. & Ald. 273. This rule was adopted also in this
country in a few early decisions, holding that a new trial could not be granted
even on motion of the accused. United States v. Gibert (1834, C. C. Ist) 2Sumner, 19. These cases, however, have been overruled in all jurisdictions in theUnited States either by decision or by statute, and a new trial may now begranted everywhere on motion of the defendant. United States v. Keen (1839,C. C. 7th) i McLean, 429; People v. Grill (19o7) 151 Calif. 592, 9i Pac. 515.In England since 1907 "motions for a new trial and the granting thereof" are
abolished. See Criminal Appeal Act, i9o7, sec. 20. The only possibility now isthat the court might grant a new trial ex proprio motu. The English courts have
refused to do this, even where the defendant has appealed. Rex v. Dyson (1908)
i Cr. App. 13; Rex vi. Dibble (i9o8) i Cr. App. 155. They still recognize the
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common-law exception where the first trial is a nullity. Rex 
v. Baker (1912) 7
Cr. App. 217; Rex v. Golatha. (1915) i1 Cr. App. 79. In 
the few cases which
have arisen in this country, the decisions are in conflict 
as to the power of
the court to grant a new trial ev proprio -motu, although 
all courts will set
aside .the judgment where the defendant has done no affirmative act. 
A few
courts argue that the defendant has everything to 
gain and nothing to lose
by a new trial. Commonwealth v. Gabor (19o4) 2o9 Pa. 
201, 58 Atl. 278.
A very striking refutation of this theory is found in 
a case where the new
trial resulted in an' increase of the sentence from six 
months to five years.
State v. Snyder (1889) 98 Mo. 555, 12 S. W. 369. Other courts 
hold it beyond
their power to grant a new trial ex proprio motu. State 
v. Williams (1886)
38 La. Ann. §0; People v. McGrath (1911) 2o- N. Y. 445, 
96 N. E. 92. In
the latter case the new trial was granted after the defendant 
asked to with-
draw his motion. American courts, however, unanimously 
hold that a new trial
may be granted by the court of its own motion on the 
theory that the accused
has waived his defense of double jeopardy, where the defendant has appealed
from the conviction and the judgment has been reversed. Stroud v. United States
(1919) 251 U. S. X5, 380 (motion for rehearing), 40 Sup. 
Ct. 5o; Harvey v. State
(igoi, Tex. Cr. App.) 64 S. W. 1o39. The adoption of this rule by the English
courts would seem an effective means of remedying a mode 
of procedure which
the English judges recognize as inadequate.
EQurTy-J IsDcrioN wHERE REs is IN FoREIG STATE.-The defendatit, 
a
resident of California, bought from the plaintiff, a resident 
of New York, a
half interest in a thoroughbred stallion. The defendant was 
to have possession
-and use of the stallion in California during the seasons of 
igig and 192o, and
the plaintiff was to have him for use in Kentucky during the 
seasons of 1921
and 1922. Upon the opening of the season of 19217 the defendant 
refused to
abide by the agreement. The plaifntiff brought this suit in New 
York, personal
service of the summons having been made upon the defendant 
in that state.
Held, that a mandatory injunction should be granted requiring the defendant
to ship the stallion to'Kentucky; and that a receiver should be 
appointed with
power to proceed to California, and take appropriate steps, 
including the
invoking of the aid of the courts, to gain possessioii of the animal 
and ship
him to the plaintiff's stock farm. Madden v. Rosseter (1921, N. Y. Sup. Ct.)
114 Misc. 416, 187 N; Y. Supp. 462.
The orthodox doctrine, that equity can enforce its decrees 
only by personal
coercion of the defendant, expressed in the formula aequitas agit in personam,
needed qualification at an early date by reason of the development of 
the writs
of assistance and sequestration. See Cook, Powers of Courts of Equity (x915)
15 CL. L, REv. io6; Huston, Enforcement of Decrees in Equity (1915) 
78-83.
By modern legislation power is generally given to courts of equity 
to grant
decrees in rem; but such statutes, of course, have no extra-territorial 
effect.
Where a subject-matter, or res, in another jurisdiction is concerned, a court of
equity may entertain the suit only in cases where it has personal jurisdiction
of the defendant and where effective relief may be given by a decree in 
personam.
See 69 L. R. A. 673-697, note. In such cases the decree is made effectual 
by
ordering the defendant to do or to refrain from certain acts toward the res,
and the res itself is thus ultimately but indirectly affected. "4 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1919) secs. 1318, 1437. Where the defendant would be
required to go into a foreign jurisdiction and there do affirmative acts, relief
may be denied. Port Royal Ry. v. Hammond (1877) 58 Ga. 523; see Beale, The
Jurisdiction of Courts over Foreigners (1913) 26 HA.v. L. REv. 293. This is
on the ground of expediency in.such cases, since interference in a foreign
sovereignty is undesirable, and siice theoretically the decree would become
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unenforceable upon the departure of the defendant, though the latter difficulty
may be eliminated by requiring him to act by agent or by requiring bond. The
more recent tendency seems to be to attach less weight to these difficulties. See
Salton Sea Cases (19o9, C. C. A. 9th) 172 Fed. 792; Vineyard Land and Stock
Co. v. Twin Falls Co. (917, C. C. A. 9th) 245 Fed. 9; see NOTES (1917) 31
HARV. L. REv. 646; COMMENTS (1917) 27 YAmE LAW JouRNAL, 946. Consistently
with the doctrine that equity acts in personam, a court having personal jurisdic-
tion of a defendant may appoint a receiver of his property in another jurisdiction.
Stewart v. Laberee (1911, C. C. A. 9th) 185 Fed. 471. The decree operates
in personam, and only upon the parties to the suit, who are rendered liable for
contempt in case they interfere in any way with the receiver's possession of the
property or his attempts to gain possession through the assistance of the courts
of the locus rei sitae. Langford v. Langford (1835) L. J. (N. s.) 5 Ch. 6o;
Schindelholz v. Cullum (1893, C. C. A. 8th) 55 Fed. 885; Maudslay v. Maudslay
[igoo] i Ch. 611. The instant case is interesting as illustrative of the lengths to
which a court of equity will go in order to give really effective relief.
EviDENcE-ADMSSIBILITY OF CONDUCT AS PART OF THE RES GsTAx.-The
defendant's chauffeur ran over and injured the plaintiff, a boy of five. The
plaintiff brought this action and on the issue of negligence offered in evidence
the fact that immediately after the accident the chauffeur jumped from the
truck and ran away. The trial court admitted the evidence and the defendant
excepted. Held, that the admission of this evidence was error, because the
chauffeur's conduct was not part of the res gestae. Molino v. City of New
York (1921, App. Div.) 186 N. Y. Supp. 742.
Such evidence, however interpreted, is not admissible against the defendant
as an admission, as the chauffeur had no authority so to prejudice his master.
Douglas v. Holyoke Mach. Co. (1919) 233 Mass. 573, 124 N. E. 478; Cross v.
Coal Co. (1916, Mo. App.) 186 S. W. 528. After the servant had testified to the
contrary, this evidence would be admissible, but only to contradict the servant.
Louisville Ry. v. Davis (i9o8) 32 Ky. L. R. 58o, io6 S. W. 304; see Loose v.
Deerfield (1915) 187 Mich, 2o6, 209, 153 N. W. 913, 914. If the servants conduct
could reasonably be interpreted as equivalent to a contemporaneous statement
by him that he was not looking ahead or that he thought the child would get out
of the way, by the weight of authority it would be admissible as a part of the
res gestae. Barrett v. Chicago Ry. (192o, Iowa) 175 N. W. 95a; Chellis Realty
Co. v. Boston Ry. (I919, N. H.) io6 Atl. 742; Louisville Ry. v. Broaddus' Adm'r.(1918) i8o Ky. 298, 202 S. W. 654. In criminal prosecutions evidence of flight
by the accused is admissible as directly relevant to show guilt. State v. Rod-
rigues (1917) 23 N. M. I56, 167 Pac. 426; Windom v. State (1917) igGa. App.
452, 91 S. E. gii; i Wigmore, Eivdence (19o4) sec. 276. (It is difficult to see
how it would be less relevant to show negligence under proper circumstances.)
In the aspect least favorable to the plaintiff the running away is equivalent to
a statement by the chauffeur that he believed he was at fault; the mere fact
that the statement was in the form of an opinion should not make it inadmissible
if all the elements necessary to make it a part of the res .gestae were present.
Cromeenes v. San Pedro Ry. (910) 37 Utah, 475, 503, 1o9 Pac. 10, 20; Cross
Lake Co. v. Joyce (1897, C. C. A. 8th) 83 Fed.- 989. Where the spontaneous
exclamation theory is not accepted, the necessary elements in this class of cases
are usually stated to be: (i) an act independently admissible; (2) statement
made contemporaneously with the act; (3) such statement relating to and tending
to explain or elucidate the act. Lund v. Tyngsborough (1851) 63 Mass. 36;
Comstock's Adn'r. v. Jacobs (1915) 89 Vt. 133, 143, 94 AtI. 497, 501. No definite
rule has been laid down by the courts as to the meaning of "contemporaneous."
It has been held improper in New York to admit statements made a few seconds
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after the occurrence. Brauer v. New York Ry. (19o9) 131 App. Div. 682, 116
N. Y. Supp. 59. On the other hand a comparatively recent Washington case
held that it was proper to admit statements made by an employee about two hours
after the accident. Walters v. Spokane Ry. (91o) 58 Wash. 293, 1O8 Pac. 593.
Under the spontaneous exclamation theory the running away in the instant case
might have been considered as equivalent to a statement made under the influence
of nervous excitement induced by a startling occurrence. In this class of cases
it is not necessary that the statement be made contemporaneously with the act.
St. Laurent v. Manchester Ry. (1915) 77 N. H. 460, 92 Atl. 959; Lambrecht v.
Schreyer (1915) 129 Minn. 271, 152 N. W. 645. Whether a given statement under
the particular circumstances was made contemporaneously with the act or under
the stress of nervous excitement, should be left largely to the discretion of the
trial court. See Washington-Virginia Ry. v. Deahl (1919) 126 Va. 141, 147, 100
S. E. 84o, 842; Lambrecht v. Schreyer, supra. It is submitted, therefore, that the
ruling of the trial court in the instant case should have been permitted to stand.
TRUSTS-RESULTING TRUSTS IN MORTGAGEs.-The plaintiff mortgaged land to
a stranger. The land was sold on a foreclosure sale to an investment company.
The plaintiff not having the means to redeem the land, the defendant advanced
a portion of the money. There was no evidence as to the intention of the
parties at the time of the redemption respecting the interest, if any, which the
defendant was to take. The plaintiff brought a bill for a decree quieting title
in himself. The lower court, on the theory of a resulting trust, decreed that
the defendant had title to an undivided share of the land, proportional to the
sum which he had advanced. Held, reversing the lower court, that a decree
should be entered quieting title to all of the land in the plaintiff. Cochran v.
Cochran (1921, Wash.) 195 Pac. 224.
Under the facts of this case there may well have been an intention by the
parties to regard the advancement made by the defendant as a mere loan. The
decision was not based on this ground, however. In Washington a mortgage is
a mere lien upon the realty and the mortgagor retains the legal title even after the
foreclosure sale and until his period of redemption expires. The decision
rests upon the theory that, where property is taken in the name of one person
and the consideration is paid by another, a resulting trust comes into existence
only where a legal title passes as a result of the purchase. Under the common-
law theory of a mortgage, whereby the legal title passes to the mortgagee, a
resulting trust arises under such circumstances. Kelly v. Jenness (1862) 50 Me.
455; Tillman v. Murrell (1898) 12o Ala. 239, 24 So. 712. Where a mere equitable
claim is bought by one and the title taken in the name of another, a resulting
trust does not arise, there "being no legal title to which the equitable title can
attach itself." Livingston v. Murphy (i9o5) 187 Mass. 315, 72 N. E. 1O12;
Boyer v. Floury (1888) 8o Ga. 312, 5 S. E. 63; contra, Munch v. Shabel (1877)
37 Mich. 166. Since there can be a trust of an equitable interest, it is difficult
to see the necessity for the transfer of a legal interest to create a resulting trust.
Under the lien theory of mortgages, where a resulting trust operates to make
the mortgagor the beneficiary and so to extinguish the mortgage, ihe courts allow
such a trust to be set up. Smith v. Balcom (1897) 24 App. Div. 437, 48 N. Y.
Supp. 487. And where to set up a resulting trust of a lien created by mort-
gage will make a stranger the trustee and the person furnishing the considera-
tion the mortgagee, the trust is upheld. Hanrion v. Hanrion (9o6) 73 Kan.
25, 84 Pac. 381; In re Tobin's Estate (1909) 139 Wis. 494, 121 N. W. 144. In
the instant case the fact that if a resulting trust is set up the trustee will be the
mortgagor, should be immaterial. He holds the legal title in his own interest
and the lien created by the mortgage only in his capacity as a passive trustee.
He is a mere conduit through which the legal powers represented by the lien
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avoid unjust enrichment and to carry out the presumed intention of the parties-
are as necessary and are as fully accomplished ii such a case as if the legal
title to the land had passed. Therefore it would seem that a resulting trust in
a mortgage in a lien theory state might well be sustained.
WILLS-CONSTRUcTION-ESTATE IN FEE CREATED BY DEVISE WITH UNLIM ITED
POWER OF DISPOSA. DURING LE.--A testator devised his real and personal
property to a woman to be used by her during her life with full powers of alien-
ation, and upon her decease without issue whatever remained unused was to
revert to the testator's estate. Held, that the devisee takes an estate in fee.
Sharpe and Clark, JJ., dissenting. Gibson v. Gibson (1921, Mich.) 181 N. W. 41.
In the construction of a will the intention of the testator, as expressed by the
words of the entire instrument, prevails, provided'it be within the rules of law,
one of which is that no limitation over after a fee simple estate is valil. Smith
v. Bell (1832, U. S.) 6' Pet. 68. Due to the vague phraseology of wills, the
cases often are confusing as to the estate devised, and the intention of the tes-
tator is exceedingly difficult to determine. For the purpose of analysis, the
decisions may be classified as follows: (I) "To A for life with unrestricted
power of disposal." Here a life estate is expressly devised, and by t':e great
weight of authority, the addition of an unrestricted power of disposal does
not enlarge the estate to a fee. Any remainders over are therefore valid.
Steiff v. Seibert (19o5) 128 Iowa, 746, I05 N. W. 328, 6 L. R. A. (N. s.) II86,
note; but see contra, Barnett v. Blain (igig) 126 Va. 179, 10 S. E. 239. (2) "To
A with restricted power of disposal." This is a general devise, but the limited
power of alienation shows an intention to pass less than a fee and the' devisee
therefore takes only a life estate. Gadd v. Stoner (1897) 113 Mich. 689, 71 N. W.
1Ill. (3) "To A with unrestricted power of disposal." Here any implication
of a life estate is destroyed by the unlimited power of disposal, and the devisee
takes a fee simple estate. Henderson v. McCowan (192o, N. J. Eq.) iio Atl.
517. But a few cases hold that where the testator has provided a remainder
over after such a general devise, his intention is to give the first devisee only a
life estate. Smith v. Bell, supra; Robinson v. Finch (1898) 116 Mich. 18o, 74
N. W. 472. Statutes in most states specifically provide that a, general devige
without words of inheritance will pass a fee unless it clearly appears that the
intention of the testator was to create a lesser estate. Mich. Comp. Laws, 1915,
sec. II8I8; see Bilger v. Nunan (igii, C. C. D. Ore.) I86 Fed. 665. (4) "To
A with unrestricted power of disposal for her natural life." Where there is no
remainder over, the devisee takes a fee, since the courts are opposed to partial
intestacy. In re Weien's Will (igo8) 139 Iowa, 657, 116 N. W. 791, 18 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 463, note; In re Hardaker's Estate (1902) 204 Pa. I81, 53 Atl. 761.
Where there is a remainder, there seem to be two distinct lines of cases. Under
one theory the devisee gets only a life estate and the remainder over is valid.
Thus in effect there is an express life estate with an unrestricted power of
disposal and a remainder over. Walker v. Pritchard (1887) 121 Ill. 221, 12 N. E.
336; Perkinson v. Clarke (19o8) r35 Wis. 584, II6 N. W. 229; see Kales, Future
Interests (2d ed. 1920) sec. i68. The other view has evidently developed as a
result of the statutes which raise a presumption of an estate in fee. The courts
hold that in the above limitation it does not clearly appear that the testator
intended to restrict the devisee to a life estate, since even were the devise
expressly in fee, the devisee would'have no greater powers. Roberts v. Lewis
(0894) 153 U. S. 367, 14 Sup. Ct. 945; Bilger v. Nunan, supra; Luckey v.
McCray (I9o4) 125 Iowa, 691, io N. W. 516. The instant case follows this
latter view which, it seems, fails to take into account the intention of the testator
as it appears from the entire will. The reasoning would apply as well to an
express life estate with unrestricted power of disposal and remainder over.
